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Summary
This report provides an overview of Egyptian politics and current issues in U.S.-
Egyptian relations. It briefly provides a political history of modern Egypt, an
overview of its political institutions, and a discussion of the prospects for
democratization in Egypt. U.S.-Egyptian relations are complex and multi-faceted,
and this report addresses the following current topics:  the Arab-Israeli peace process,
Iraq, terrorism, democratization and reform, human rights, trade, and military
cooperation.  This report will be updated regularly.  For more information on Egypt,
see CRS Report RS22274, Egypt: 2005 Presidential and Parliamentary Elections.
U.S. policy on Egypt is aimed at maintaining regional stability, improving
bilateral relations, continuing military cooperation, and sustaining the March 1979
Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty.  Successive Administrations have long viewed Egypt
as a leader and moderating influence in the Middle East, though in recent years, there
have been increasing calls for Egypt to democratize. 
Congressional views of U.S.-Egyptian relations vary. Some lawmakers view
Egypt as stabilizing the region and helping to extend U.S. influence in the most
populous Arab country. Others would like the United States to pressure Egypt to
implement political reforms, improve its human rights record, and take a more active
role in reducing Arab-Israeli tensions.
Among the current issues in U.S.-Egyptian relations are a shared concern about
international terrorism. Egypt can claim some experience with the subject, having
defeated domestic Islamist terrorists intent on overthrowing the government. As the
war on terror continues, the United States relies on Egypt for intelligence
cooperation. Egypt provided valuable support during Operation Enduring Freedom
in Afghanistan. On the issue of Iraqi reconstruction, Egypt is helping to train Iraqi
security forces and has offered to increase its efforts.  Egypt and the United States
agree on the importance of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty and the need to continue
current Arab-Israel peace talks.  In support of this process, Egypt has been training
Palestinian police and has sent 750 Egyptian soldiers to the Egypt-Gaza border in
order to prevent weapons smuggling following Israel’s recent withdrawal from Gaza.
The United States and Egypt disagree over the speed and depth of, but not the
need for, some of Egypt’s economic reforms. The two governments differ on Egypt’s
need to introduce democratic reforms, and many U.S. officials argue that Egypt is not
moving quickly enough toward full democracy or in improving the human rights
situation. Others caution that movement toward democracy carries a risk of
establishment of an Islamist government. 
The United States has provided Egypt with an annual average of over $2 billion
in economic and military foreign assistance since 1979.  The United States will
reduce Economic Support Funds (ESF) to about $400 million per year by 2008 in
keeping with a plan to reduce aid to both Israel and Egypt.  The Administration
requested $455 million in economic grants and $1.3 billion in military grants for
FY2007 for Egypt.
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Egypt:  Background and U.S. Relations
Most Recent Developments
On June 8, 2006, the House narrowly defeated an amendment (198-225) to H.R.
5522, the FY2007 Foreign Operations Appropriations Bill, which would have
reallocated $100 million in economic aid to Egypt and use it instead to fight AIDS
worldwide and to assist the Darfur region of Sudan. Many supporters of the
amendment were dismayed by the Egyptian government’s spring 2006 crackdown on
pro-democracy activists in Cairo. 
On May 12, 2006, the General Accountability Office, the investigative agency
of Congress, released a report on U.S. military assistance to Egypt, recommending
that the U.S. State Department and Pentagon assess the potential impact of possible
future shifts in U.S. military aid to Egypt and release periodic evaluations of the U.S.
Foreign Military Financing program in Egypt. 
On May 11-12, 2006, thousands of Egyptian police clashed with protestors in
downtown Cairo during demonstrations  in support of greater political freedom and
judicial independence. The protests were sparked by ongoing disciplinary
proceedings against two senior judges who face expulsion from the judiciary for
accusing the government of fixing elections. The U.S. State Department said it was
“deeply concerned” over police repression of the protesters. 
On May 3, 2006, in an amendment to the Senate-passed version of H.R. 4939,
the FY2006 Emergency Supplemental bill, the Senate rescinded $47 million in
FY2006 economic aid to Egypt (cash grant portion). The June 8, 2006, conference
agreement on H.R. 4939 (H.Rept. 109-494) did not include the rescission. 
On May 2, 2006, U.S. State Department Spokesman Sean McCormack
commented on the  the Egyptian parliament’s approval of the two-year extension of
the nation’s 25-year old emergency laws, saying that “It’s a disappointment. We
understand that Egypt is facing its own issues related to terrorism, but President
Mubarak during the presidential campaign had talked about the fact that he was going
to seek a new emergency law, but one that would be targeted specifically at fighting
terrorism, counterterrorism, and that would take into account respect for freedom of
speech as well as human rights. Certainly we would like to see President Mubarak
and his government follow through on that pledge.”
On April 24, 2006, Egyptian terrorists attacked the Sinai Peninsula resort town
of Dahab, killing 21 people and injuring hundreds. Two days later, suicide bombers
attacked a police station in the northern Sinai and a base camp of the Multinational
Force and Observers, a peacekeeping mission that was created as part of the 1979
peace treaty between Egypt and Israel. Two people were injured in the attacks. 
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1 Library of Congress, Federal Research Division, Egypt: A Country Study, accessible at
[http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/egtoc.html].
2  Napoleon invaded Egypt in 1798. The British invaded in 1882 and established a de facto
protectorate. They would keep a sizeable military force in Egypt until the 1950s.  
Historical Background 
Egypt During the Colonial Era 
Egypt’s relations with the West, including its current friendly relations with the
United States, are colored by a long history of foreign intervention in Egyptian
politics, which has made Egypt, along with other Arab states, wary of outside
influences on their domestic affairs.  In the 19th century, Egypt was a semi-
autonomous province in the Ottoman Empire, which by then was in decline and
being propped up by the British in order to serve as a buffer between it and Czarist
Russia.  At the time, Egypt was viewed as extremely valuable to the British and
French empires and was prized for its agricultural output, large domestic market, and
strategic location between the Mediterranean and Red Seas.  Most importantly, the
British saw Egypt as vital to securing the sea route to its most prized colony, India.
Ottoman weakness led its Sultans to grant Europeans certain legal protections and
economic advantages in Egypt, which stifled the Egyptian economy by flooding it
with European manufactured goods, driving local merchants out of business.1  Over
time, Egypt developed a “cash crop” economy based almost solely on the export of
cotton, the price of which constantly fluctuated, leaving the economy vulnerable and
dependent on good harvests.  Without a strong, diverse economy, Egypt could not
generate enough capital to fund its modernization, leading it to become even more
financially dependent on the West, as it rulers borrowed huge sums from European
banks. Six years after the completion of the Suez Canal in 1869, Egypt was forced
to sell all of its shares in the Suez Canal Company, which operated the Canal,  in
order to make payments on its foreign-owned debt.  When Egypt could no longer pay
its debts, the British and French became directly involved in Egyptian politics — a
trend that would continue until the mid 20th century.2 
The Constitutional Monarchy & the British
Britain unilaterally declared Egyptian independence in 1922, and for the next
three decades, political power in Egypt was contested among three main actors:  the
British, the Egyptian monarchy, and the nationalist Wafd party, which was the
driving force behind the Egyptian independence movement after World War I.
Thousands of British troops remained stationed near the Suez Canal, and British
officials served in the Egyptian ministries. Egypt’s king could appoint a government
and dismiss parliament, but ultimately relied on the British for support.  The Wafd
party dominated parliamentary elections during Egypt’s experiment with
parliamentary democracy (1922-1952), though the Wafd gradually began to lose
popularity to more radical organizations, such as the Muslim Brotherhood. 
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Figure 1.  Map of Egypt
Nasser and Egypt During the Cold War
By the early 1950s, anti-British sentiment in Egypt had sparked civil unrest,
allowing a cabal of Egyptian Army officers, known as the Free Officers Movement,
to oust the king in what is referred to as the July 1952 revolution.  The Free Officer
Movement ushered in an era of military involvement in Egyptian politics, as all of
Egypt’s presidents in the post-revolutionary period have been high ranking officers.
In the aftermath of the coup, Colonel Gamal Abdul Nasser, the most charismatic of
the Free Officers, succeeded in gaining total control over the government. Nasser
abolished  the monarchy and outlawed the Muslim Brotherhood (1954), which at the
time was the only potential rival for power. Nasser would rule Egypt until his death
in 1970.
During the Nasser era, Egypt found itself at the center of superpower
competition for influence in the Middle East. Wary of taking sides, Nasser managed,
for a short period,  to steer Egypt clear of either the Soviet or Western “camp” and
was instrumental in helping to establish the non-aligned movement.  U.S.-Egyptian
relations soured when Nasser turned to the Soviets and the Czechs in 1955 for
military training and equipment after the West, frustrated by Nasser’s repeated
CRS-4
3 M.E. Yapp, The Near East Since the First World War, London: Longman, 1991, p. 409.
4 During the Yemeni Civil War of 1963 through 1967, Egypt reportedly used mustard bombs
in support of South Yemen against Saudi-backed royalist troops in North Yemen.  See
Federation of American Scientists (FAS) Egypt Special Weapons Guide, available online
at [http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/egypt/index.html].
5 One of the Brotherhood activists arrested was Sayyid Qutb, a writer and former
government official whose writings provided a philosophical foundation for Islamic
radicalism. Qutb spent years in prison and, after being briefly released in 1964, was
rearrested and hanged in 1966.  See Daniel Benjamin & Steven Simon, The Age of Sacred
Terror (New York: Random House, 1966), p. 62. 
rejections and his support of Algerian independence against the French,  refused to
provide Egypt with defense assistance.  A year later, following a U.S.-British
decision to retract an offer of economic assistance and help for the construction of
the Aswan Dam, Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal Company to use its revenues to
finance the dam project.  (Egypt owned the Suez Canal, but the British-French
company operated the Canal, and collected the revenues from which it paid a small
rent to Egypt.) In October 1956, Israel, France, and Britain invaded Egypt — Israel
to stop Palestinian guerrillas from using Egypt as a base for operations against Israel,
and France and Britain to occupy the Canal.  President Eisenhower persuaded the
three countries to withdraw from Egypt in early 1957, which briefly improved U.S.-
Egyptian relations.3
After the 1956 Suez War, Nasser’s popularity soared, as he came to embody
Arab nationalism in the post-colonial era.  Nasser did not hesitate to brandish his
newfound authority and developed a muscular Egyptian foreign policy that attempted
to destabilize pro-Western governments in Jordan, Iraq, and Lebanon, support
Palestinian guerrilla action against Israel, create a unified Arab state by merging
briefly with Syria (the United Arab Republic 1958-1961), and intervene against the
Saudi-backed royalists in the Yemeni civil war.4  However, Egypt’s defeat at the
hands of Israel in the June 1967 War and other setbacks temporarily deflated
Nasser’s popularity and crushed his ambitions to spread a pan-Arab ideology across
the region. 
On the domestic front, Nasser turned Egypt into a socialist dictatorship with
absolute power in the hands of the President.  All banks and commercial firms were
nationalized, large landowning estates were broken up into much smaller parcels and
held in a state trust, and all political parties were banned. The precursor to the present
National Democratic Party (NDP) was formed by Nasser in 1962 and was called the
Arab Socialist Union. It served as the Egyptian republic’s first mass party and an
extension of the ruling elite. Other movements, such as the Muslim Brotherhood,
were forced to go underground, as Nasser arrested thousands of Brotherhood activists
after a failed Brotherhood assassination attempt against him in 1954.5
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6  A copy of the 1979 Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty is available online from MidEast Web
Gateway at [http://www.mideastweb.org/egyptisraeltreaty.htm].
7 The MFO is an independent (non-UN) peacekeeping mission, created as a result of the
1979 peace treaty.  The MFO’s expenses are funded in equal parts by Egypt, Israel, and the
United States with additional contributions from Germany, Japan, and Switzerland.  For
more information on the MFO, see [http://www.mfo.org/Default.asp?bhcp=1].
Egypt-Israeli Peace 
After Nasser’s death in 1970, Anwar Sadat, one of the original Free Officers,
became President of Egypt. At the time, Egypt was humiliated by its defeat in the
June 1967 War and the ensuing loss of the Sinai Peninsula to Israel.  In addition,
military rebuilding expenditures were absorbing nearly 25% of Egypt’s gross
domestic product. Under these circumstances, Sadat calculated that a military victory
was needed to boost his own legitimacy and improve Egypt’s position in any future
negotiations with Israel.  The October 1973 War, which initially took Israel by
surprise, was costly for both sides, but succeeded in boosting Sadat’s credibility with
the Egyptian people, enabling him to embark on a path which would ultimately sever
Egypt’s ties to the Soviet Union and bring it closer to the West. 
In November 1973, Egypt and the United States restored diplomatic relations
(which had been cut off in 1967) and, in December, the two countries participated in
the Geneva peace conference.  U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger’s shuttle
diplomacy led to Egyptian-Israeli and Syrian-Israeli disengagement agreements in
1974 and a second set of Egyptian-Israeli disengagements in 1975.  The United States
resumed economic aid to Egypt in 1975 after an eight-year hiatus. 
The United States endorsed Anwar al-Sadat’s historic trip to Jerusalem in
November 1977, and President Jimmy Carter assisted in the Israeli-Egyptian peace
negotiations at Camp David in September 1978 and the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty
of March 1979.6   The United States helped organize the peacekeeping mission along
the Egyptian-Israeli border, the Multi-National Force and Observers (MFO), and still
maintains a rotating infantry task force as part of it.7 
Egypt Under Mubarak
Sadat’s rule came to an abrupt end in 1981, when he was assassinated during a
military parade in Cairo by soldiers who also belonged to the Jamaah Islamiyah
(Islamic Group) and Al Jihad, the more radical offshoots of the Muslim Brotherhood.
Hosni Mubarak, Sadat’s Vice President and former commander of the Egyptian Air
Force, immediately ascended to the presidency and has remained in office to the
present day.  Under Mubarak, Egypt has continued to maintain good relations with
the United States, as evident in Egypt’s 1991 decision to join the allied coalition
against Saddam Hussein in Operation Desert Storm. Following the path laid out by
Sadat, Egypt has remained at peace with Israel, although critics have characterized
this as a “cold peace.”  Mubarak has made a number of attempts to serve as a broker
for Israeli-Palestinian peace talks, most notably in 1999 and 2000, when Egypt hosted
the signing of an Israeli-Palestinian agreement for implementing past commitments
and meetings between then Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and former
CRS-6
8 In 1980, the Constitution was amended to allow the President to run for an unlimited
number of terms, rather than one as was stipulated in the 1971 Constitution. An English
language version of the Constitution is available at [http://www.parliament.gov.eg/EPA/
en/sections.jsp?typeID=1&levelid=54&parentlevel=6&levelno=2].
Palestine President Yasir Arafat respectively.  During the Mubarak era, the ongoing
conflict between Egyptian Islamists and the Egyptian authorities continued,
culminating in a period (1992-1997) of  violent confrontations between Islamic
militants and Egyptian police. 
After the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks and the ensuing U.S. focus on
promoting democracy in the Middle East, the Mubarak regime has come under
increasing U.S. pressure to accelerate political reforms and make Egypt more
democratic. In an effort to control the reform agenda without relinquishing their grip
on power, Mubarak and the ruling National Democratic Party (NDP) have instituted
some political reforms, while emphasizing the need for economic growth as a




Since the 1952 revolution, Egypt
has officially been a republic, and its
political system has developed some
aspects of a democracy, though most
observers continue to describe Egypt as
an authoritarian regime dominated by a
strong executive, who draws his
support from the ruling National
Democratic Party (NDP) and the
military. Under the 1971 Constitution,
authority is vested in an elected
president who must stand for reelection
every six years.8  The President
appoints the cabinet, who in turn draft
and submit legislation to the
legislature, the People’s Assembly
(lower house) and the Shura Council
(upper house).  The People’s Assembly debates legislation proposed by government
ministries and calls for amendments to government-sponsored bills but rarely
initiates its own bills.  The Shura Council is an advisory body, offering reports and
recommendations on important subjects, but the Shura Council does not introduce,
consider, or vote on legislation.  Overall, analysts consider Egypt’s legislative branch
to be weak; the ruling party constitutes an overwhelming majority. 
In the People’s Assembly, 444 members are elected and ten are appointed by the
President; 176 members of the Shura Council are elected and 88 are appointed. One
Egypt at a Glance
Population: 77 million (est.)
GDP per Capita: $1,100-$1,400
Religions: 90% Sunni Muslim
10% Coptic Christian
Literacy Rate: 57% (47% female)
Unemployment Rate: 15%-20% (est.)
External Debt:
(as % of GDP)
$33 billion
37.8%
Source:  U.S. Central Intelligence Agency
World Factbook 2005.
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9 “Clearing the Path For Scion of Egypt,” Washington Post, March 10, 2006.
10 “Gamal Mubarak Says He Has No Intention to Run for Presidency to Succeed His
Father,” Associated Press, January 24, 2006.
11  In 1986, President Mubarak called on the military to put down riots in Cairo, sparked by
(continued...)
half of the elected members of the People’s Assembly and the Shura Council must
be farmers and laborers (Art. 87 and Art. 196 of the Constitution).  People’s
Assembly members are elected for five-year terms, and Shura Council members for
six-year terms (one-half the Council members are elected every three years).
Currently, the ruling National Democratic Party (NDP) controls 324 seats in
parliament, Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated members hold 88 seats, and the remaining
seats are held by a mix of independents and secular opposition parties.  NDP
members won 74 of the 88 seats contested in the May/June 2001 Shura Council
election, with independents winning the other 14 seats.  Religious parties, such as the
Muslim Brotherhood, are officially banned.
Presidential Succession.  Under Egyptian law, if the President should
become incapacitated, the Speaker of the People’s Assembly becomes the interim
President until the People’s Assembly can nominate a new President and the name
can be submitted to the people in a referendum.  A Vice President plays no special
role in the transition, but in practice, recent Egyptian Presidents were succeeded by
their Vice Presidents.  The health of 78-year old President Hosni Mubarak, who has
not named a Vice President, has been questioned. Some analysts believe that
Egyptian intelligence chief, Omar Suleiman, who has recently been an interlocutor
between Palestinians and Israelis, could be a potential successor to Mubarak. 
The Rise of Gamal Mubarak. Though President Hosni Mubarak has
vehemently denied that he is grooming his 42-year old son Gamal to succeed him,
the younger Mubarak has had a meteoric rise to the highest levels of the Egyptian
government in a short period of time, suggesting to many observers that his accession
to the presidency may be imminent. According to a March 2006 Washington Post
article, Gamal Mubarak was recently named as one of three Deputy Secretary
Generals of the NDP party, and many of his associates now fill the cabinet and party
leadership.9  In press interviews, Gamal Mubarak himself has refuted rumors that he
will run for president in any future election, saying “I don’t have the intention or the
desire to be a candidate. I repeat and emphasize again I don’t have this intention or
desire, this is clear talk for those who want to understand.”10 In May 2006, Gamal
Mubarak secretly traveled to Washington for meetings with Vice President Cheney
and other high-level U.S. officials. Many commentators have speculated over the
purpose of the meetings, which came amid social unrest and demonstrations in Cairo.
Some analysts believe that Gamal’s trip signifies his eventual ascension to the
presidency.
The Role of the Military in Egyptian Society.  Although military officers
no longer play a direct role in the affairs of the civilian-run Egyptian government, the
military is the preeminent institution in Egyptian society, and has been called on by
successive governments to maintain internal security and regime stability.11  From an
CRS-8
11 (...continued)
the protests of Central Security conscripts who were angry with their low pay and poor
working conditions.  The military also was deployed in 1977 during riots over a temporary
reduction in food subsidies. 
12 Imad Harb, “The Egyptian Military in Politics: Disengagement or Accommodation?,” The
Middle East Journal, Washington, spring 2003. vol. 57, Issue 2, p. 269. 
13 The NDP’s website is available at [http://www.ndp.org.eg/index_en.htm].
14 According to Egyptian law #47 (1972), the Egyptian Justice Ministry controls the pay and
promotion scales for judges, thereby making many judges hesitant to rule against the
government out of concern for their own careers and livelihoods. 
economic standpoint, the military also provides employment and social services for
hundreds of thousands of young people in a country with annual double digit
unemployment rates.  Military experts have often asserted that Egypt’s armed forces
are bloated and maintain manpower at unnecessary levels for peacetime. In response,
Egyptian officials and some scholars assert that the large size of Egypt’s military is
justified based on the services it provides to soldiers and their families.  Some
estimate that the military trains 12% of young Egyptian males and that Egypt’s
defense industries employ over 100,000 people.12  The Egyptian military has its own
companies, which produce consumer products, pharmaceuticals, and manufactured
goods.  The Egyptian officer corps also benefit from higher salaries, better housing,
and high quality healthcare, which help ensure their loyalty to the government.  Some
members of the opposition have criticized these special benefits and the military’s
fiscal autonomy, asserting that there is little civilian control over the military’s
budget.
The National Democratic Party (NDP).13  As the ruling party, the NDP
dominates the political scene in Egypt, controlling well over 80% of the seats in
parliament. In the 2000 parliamentary election, popular dissatisfaction with the status
quo led to the defeat of many NDP incumbents, though the party maintained its
supra-majority in parliament after a number of “independents” who had been NDP
members rejoined the party.  Thereafter, NDP officials embarked on a campaign to
improve the party’s public image, holding the first party congress in 10 years in 2002.
Since then, the NDP has held conferences in each successive year, touting a number
of political reforms under the slogan of “new thinking.”  More importantly, the
President’s son, Gamal Mubarak, was appointed to the NDP’s higher policy council,
and other young reformers have become more visible in the party.  Many analysts
speculate that the NDP is undergoing a generational struggle between an “old guard”
linked to tradition and deliberate change and young reformers who want rapid, far-
reaching change.  Others believe that even if a “new guard” were to  gain control of
the party, they would make no dramatic departures from previous NDP policies. 
The Judiciary and Calls for Judicial Independence.  Although Articles
64 and 65 of the Constitution guarantee the independence of the judiciary, the state
continues to hold sway over most judges and courts.14 However, many analysts
consider this branch of government to hold the most potential for exercising greater
“checks and balances” on the regime. Some judges have spoken openly about
election abuses allegedly committed by pro-government forces in 2005. In April and
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May 2006, there were a number of demonstrations against the Mubarak regime. The
protests were sparked by the state’s disciplinary proceedings against two of Egypt’s
most senior judges, Mahmoud Mekki and Hisham Bastawisi, who were stripped of
their judicial immunity and detained after publicly charging electoral fraud during
parliamentary elections late last year. Bastawisi, who suffered a heart attack before
his hearing, was warned that another offense would lead to his dismissal from the
judiciary, while Mekki was cleared of all charges. 
Opposition Parties and Movements
Political opposition in Egypt is divided among legal opposition parties approved
by the government, the outlawed Muslim Brotherhood, considered the most powerful
opposition force, and a small array of new movements, such as Kefaya (“Enough”),
composed of civil society activists, academics, and intellectuals.  By law, political
parties must be approved by the seven-member Political Parties Committee (PPC).
Since 1977, the Committee has approved 18 political parties and rejected almost 50.
The current make-up of the PPC consists of the Shura Council chairman, three
former senior judges, and the ministers of interior, parliamentary affairs and justice.
In September 2004, NDP officials announced plans to amend the 1977 political
parties law by adding three non-partisan public figures to the committee, though its
members would still be chosen by the President.
Legal Opposition Parties
Most experts regard Egypt’s legal opposition parties as divided with limited
popular support.  In the 2000 parliamentary elections, the principal opposition parties
secured just 17 seats, despite widespread popular dissatisfaction with the ruling NDP.
In 2005, these parties fared even worse, winning just 12 seats.  Most recognized
opposition parties publish their own newspapers, which frequently criticize the
government and often expose human rights abuses.   Most parties receive government
subsidies and, in some cases, subsidies from foreign interests.
The Al Ghad Party (Tomorrow) & Ayman Nour.  Ayman Nour, a former
member of the Egyptian parliament and second place finisher in Egypt’s first multi-
candidate presidential election in 2005, is currently serving a five-year sentence for
forgery in a prison hospital. On May 19, 2006, Egypt’s highest appeals court rejected
Ayman Nour’s appeal for a retrial.  He cannot file another appeal.  Nour’s
imprisonment is considered a stumbling block in U.S.-Egyptian bilateral relations,
though opinions differ on how much of an impact his imprisonment will have over
the long term. Most analysts believe that improvements in the relationship, such as
announcing the United States’ intention to negotiate a U.S.-Egyptian free trade
agreement, has been put on hold in part due to the treatment of Nour. In addition,
Nour’s imprisonment could bolster efforts to alter Egypt’s foreign assistance package
in Congress. In 2002, the Administration and Congress rejected $134 million in new
economic assistance for Egypt to protest the imprisonment of Saad Eddin Ibrahim.
In many ways, Nour’s case is a trial balloon for the Administration’s larger efforts
to promote democracy in the region, and many observers are curious as to how far
the Bush Administration will push Egypt on the Nour issue. Experts note that
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Brotherhood branches throughout the Middle East region. Former Brotherhood members
also have formed a number of radical and extremist off-shoots, including Hamas.  See Gilles
Kippel, Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002),
p. 151. 
16 John Walsh, “Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood,” Harvard International Review (Cambridge:
winter 2003), vol. 24, issue 4, p. 32.
political reform is just one of a number of U.S. policy goals with Egypt and that other
priorities, including security cooperation, intelligence-sharing, and promoting peace
in the region, could influence U.S.-Egyptian relations.
The Muslim Brotherhood 
The Muslim Brotherhood (MB) was founded in Egypt in 1928 to turn Egypt
away from secularism and toward an Islamic government based on Sharia (religious)
law and Muslim principles.15  The Muslim Brotherhood operates as a religious
charitable and educational institution, having been banned as a political party in
1954; however, many Muslim Brotherhood members run for parliament as
independents. In the 2000 parliamentary elections, 17 independent candidates, who
were regarded as Brotherhood sympathizers, were elected.  In 2005, Brotherhood-
affiliated candidates won 88 seats in parliament. Over the years, the Egyptian
government has alternated between tolerating and suppressing the Muslim
Brotherhood, sometimes arresting and jailing its members, and other times allowing
its members to operate almost without hindrance.
Many foreign observers agree that the organization has renounced the use of
violence as a political tactic, while many Egyptian officials continue to perceive the
Brotherhood as a threat and are unwilling to legalize the movement.  In the West, the
issue of whether or not to  recognize the Muslim Brotherhood as a legitimate political
actor continues to perplex policymakers, particularly after the September 11, 2001
terrorist attacks.  On the one hand, there has been a general reluctance to push for
Islamist inclusion in politics, out of concern that, once in power, groups such as the
Muslim Brotherhood will pursue policies counter to Western interests in the region
or will transform states into theocracies.  On the other hand, some experts believe
that if these groups are not brought into the political mainstream, they will eventually
resort to violence out of frustration. 
Most analysts believe that, from an organizational standpoint, the Brotherhood
is the only movement capable of mobilizing significant opposition to the government,
though opinions vary on how much mass support the Brotherhood commands.  As
is typical for Islamist groups across the region, the Muslim Brotherhood is strongest
among the professional middle class, controlling many of the professional syndicates
(associations), including those representing engineers, doctors, lawyers and
academics.16
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Organization Activism,” July 2005.  Available online at [http://hrw.org/english/docs/2005/
07/04/egypt11217.htm].
The Egyptian Movement for Change — Kefaya (Enough)
In December 2004, a group of political activists, most of whom are secular in
orientation and hail from Egyptian universities, formed the Egyptian Movement for
Change, or what has been referred to in Arabic as Kefaya (enough), their primary
slogan which refers to their opposition to a further term for President Mubarak. Since
its formation, the movement has held a number of small demonstrations, and some
of the group’s members have been detained. In May 2005, female Kefaya activists
accused Egyptian police officers of sexually assaulting female protesters, which led
to widespread condemnation of the government by both secular and Islamic
opposition forces.  Kefaya, which encompasses a mix of opposition groups,
boycotted the 2005 presidential election.
Civil Society in Egypt
Although political opposition continues to be stymied, observers note that, over
the past two decades, Egypt has developed a vibrant civil society, which some
development experts hope will further democratization in the country.  The term
“civil society” generally refers to the growing number of non-governmental
organizations (NGO), charities, and advocacy groups that openly operate in Egyptian
society.  Many of these groups pursue so-called “safe issues,” such as women’s
rights, human rights, and social equality, as a way to work toward the much broader
goal of democratization.  Often times, the Egyptian government has created its own
associations in order to boost its reform image at home and abroad, such as the
government-sponsored National Council on Human Rights.  
In Egypt, NGOs are required to apply for legal status and, according to
Association Law 84-2003, NGOs must be registered with the Ministry of Social
Affairs. There are an estimated 16,000 registered civic organizations in Egypt.  In
some cases, it may take years before the ministry rules on an application, and many
groups are routinely rejected.  If an NGO’s application is rejected, it has few legal
rights and can be shut down.  Its members can be imprisoned. However, even
registered NGOs must tread carefully when engaging in sensitive political issues, as
some groups have been periodically closed or have had their legal status revoked.
NGO’s also must report all foreign donations to the Ministry of Social Affairs.
Overall, tolerance for the activities of non-registered groups varies, and many NGOs
operate without any legal protection.17 
Saad al-Din Ibrahim.  In 2000, authorities closed the internationally-
recognized Egyptian NGO known as the Ibn Khaldun Center for Development
Studies and arrested its director, Saad al-Din Ibrahim, a sociology professor at
American University of Cairo. Ibrahim, who also holds U.S. citizenship, was arrested
for defaming Egypt by describing discrimination against Coptic Christians and for
not reporting a foreign donation from the European Union for a voter education
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18 In August 2002, the Bush Administration rejected an Egyptian request for economic
assistance as part of the FY2002 Supplemental Act (P.L. 107-206) in order to protest the
arrest and conviction of Ibrahim. The House Appropriations Committee had already
considered and  rejected an amendment to the FY2002 supplemental appropriations bill
(H.R. 4775) to provide $134 million in economic assistance for Egypt.  The proposed funds
for Egypt would have maintained the three-to-two ratio of aid to Israel and Egypt; Israel was
slated to receive $200 million in ESF in the supplemental bill.
19 Egypt was readmitted to the Arab League in 1989 during a period of renewed international
interest in Arab-Israeli peace. 
project.  The international community condemned Ibrahim’s detention and
conviction, and the United States withheld extra foreign assistance in protest.18  On
March 18, 2003, an Egyptian court acquitted Ibrahim, and he was released.  Analysts
note that Ibrahim is not a popular figure in Egyptian politics but is respected at home
and abroad for his work to promote reform.  During the September 2005 presidential
election, Ibrahim helped organize election monitors to observe the voting process and
report violations.
Current Issues in U.S.-Egyptian Relations
Hamas
With the recent electoral victory of Hamas, Egypt, Israel, and the United States
all have a shared interest in attempting to moderate and isolate a Hamas-led
Palestinian government and prevent it from further exacerbating conflict in the
region.  Though Egypt has often tried to steer a neutral course in dealing with the
Palestinians, most observers believe that Hamas’s rise to prominence poses a number
of challenges for Egyptian diplomacy in the region, since the Egyptian government
has traditionally been at odds with its own domestic Islamist groups.  On March 13,
2006, President Hosni Mubarak stated after a meeting with European Union (EU)
officials that the EU should not cut off aid to the Palestinian Authority, remarking,
“the aid is used by the man-in-the-street to buy medicine and to send his children to
school.  If this money is cut, terrorism will grow and all the [Palestinian] people will
suffer.”
Arab-Israeli Peace
The 1979 Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty has served as the basis for good relations
between Egypt and the United States.  Although Israel and Egypt have maintained
cool relations since then, both parties have maintained the peace, and the United
States has continued to underwrite the “costs” of peace by providing high amounts
of annual economic and military aid to both parties.  One “cost” for Egypt was the
diplomatic isolation it suffered following the peace treaty.  In 1979, Egypt was
expelled from the Arab League, an organization it had helped found.19  At the time,
the rest of the Arab world had felt betrayed by Egypt for making a separate peace
with Israel.
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20 In June 2005, Egypt and Israel signed a long-delayed $2.5 billion agreement on sales of
Egyptian natural gas to Israel. Under the terms of the agreement, Israeli state-owned utility
Israel Electric Corp will purchase gas from Eastern Mediterranean Gas (EMG), a private
Israeli-Egyptian firm. A pipeline from Egypt to Israel is being built. 
Despite the treaty, the development of close economic, political, and diplomatic
relations between Israel and Egypt has been limited since 1979.  Although there have
been some initiatives in recent years, such as President Mubarak’s attendance at the
funeral for former Israeli  Prime Minister Rabin and recent energy cooperation
agreements,20 overall relations remain cool. In 1995, relations were strained when
Egypt advocated Israeli signature of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Tensions
arose again when Egypt withdrew its ambassador to Tel Aviv in November 2000 to
protest Israeli actions against the Palestinians at the start of the latest intifada. Prime
Minister Ariel Sharon sent two envoys to Cairo shortly after his February 6, 2001
election, reportedly to request the return of the Egyptian ambassador and to seek
Egyptian assistance in moderating Arab League reactions to Israeli policies.  Egypt
announced that it would return its ambassador to Tel Aviv at the February 8, 2005
Palestinian-Israeli summit meeting at Sharm al-Shaykh. 
Most experts believe that progress in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process is the
key to improved Egyptian-Israeli relations, as well as Israel’s wider relationships with
the Arab world. In light of the continued stalemate on the peace process, President
Mubarak has attempted to act as a broker, advisor, messenger, and arbitrator in the
hopes of galvanizing both sides to take the necessary risks for peace.  In addition,
Egypt’s intelligence chief, Omar Suleiman, has met with Hamas and Palestinian
Authority figures in order to secure ceasefire arrangements with Israel. Since the
resumption of negotiations in the early 1990s, Egypt has taken the following major
actions to support the peace process, among other steps:
! Endorsed the Declaration of Principles signed by the PLO and Israel
in Washington on September 13, 1993;
 
! Hosted the September 4, 1999 Sharm al-Shaykh signing of an
Israeli-Palestinian agreement for implementing past commitments;
! Hosted the meetings between then Secretary of State Madeleine
Albright and Palestine President Arafat at Sharm al-Shaykh on
October 4, 2000, and also hosted the Arab League meetings that
began on October 21; and
! Hosted the February 8, 2005 meeting between Israeli Prime Minister
Sharon and Palestinian President Abbas at Sharm al-Shaykh.
Egypt’s Role in the Gaza Withdrawal. Israel unilaterally dismantled its
settlements and withdrew its troops from the Gaza Strip in August and September
2005. In order to facilitate a smooth transition and take an active role in Israeli-
Palestinian peace, Egypt offered to post border guards on the Gaza-Egyptian border,
increase its efforts to reorganize and train Palestinian security forces, and halt
smuggling of contraband into Gaza. After extensive negotiations with Israeli
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officials, Egypt deployed 750 border guards to secure “the Philadelphi Route,” a strip
of land in Egypt immediately adjacent to the Gaza Strip that is notorious for tunnels
used for smuggling weapons and narcotics. The memorandum of understanding
between Israel and Egypt delineates the type of equipment the Egyptians may use
(small arms and jeeps, no heavy armor) and the length of the patrol area (14km on
the ground and 3 km into the sea).21  Most importantly, Egypt is said to have
promised not to provide weapons to Palestinian forces in order to allay Israeli
concerns that such weapons may be used in terrorist attacks.
After the last Israeli soldiers withdrew, Egyptian border guards began allowing
some Gazans to cross the border into Egypt despite Israeli calls for the temporary
closing of the border. Reports indicate that there was an initial surge in Palestinians
crossing and that Egyptian officials may have been reluctant to enforce a strict
closure of the border for fear of sparking a violent confrontation. On October 26,
2005, Israel accepted an Egyptian proposal to reopen the Rafah border crossing
between Egypt and the Gaza Strip. Under the terms of the arrangement, the Rafah
terminal will be operated under joint Palestinian-Egyptian management, with
European inspectors monitoring all entrants. The Rafah terminal will be used for the
movement of people only; merchandise will be moved through a new terminal built
in Kerem Shalom, Israel on the Israeli-Egyptian-Palestinian border.
Egyptian officials share the opinion of other governments in the region that the
unilateral Israeli withdrawal from Gaza should be the first step toward a general
withdrawal of all Israeli forces from Palestinian territory. The Egyptians and others
point out that Israeli withdrawal is called for in U.N. resolutions, particularly 242,
and the recent “Road Map” approach to peace, and that many Israelis also favor
withdrawal. Egyptian leaders believe that the United States should be less inclined
to accept and support Israeli positions and more inclined to support what they view
as an even handed approach that will ensure Palestinian rights. Egyptians also point
out that the Road Map calls for Israel to stop building and expanding settlements in
the occupied territories, and argue that the United States should be more forceful in
compelling Israel to meet those commitments.
Recent Developments in Egyptian-Israeli Relations. In June 2006,
Israeli soldiers killed two Egyptian infiltrators who were identified as policemen
responsible for guarding the Israeli-Egyptian border in the Sinai. The Egyptians had
crossed into Israel and opened fire against an Israeli tank crew. The incident occurred
two days before Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert traveled to Sharm al-Shaykh for
a meeting with Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak. During the talks, Olmert praised
Mubarak stating that “The relationship between Egypt and Israel is very qualitative
and very central to our world view and to the types of relations we want to build in
the region. The leadership of Hosni Mubarak is an important key to the success of
this process.” Reportedly, Olmert sought Mubarak’s approval of Israel’s planned
withdrawal from parts of the West Bank. 
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23 “Friction Over Egypt’s Role in Regional Issues Strains Relations With U.S.,” Washington
Post, May 25, 2003.
24  In helping to rebuild Afghanistan, Egypt built a field hospital at Bagram Air Base. It has
declined to send peacekeeping forces there. 
25 “Mubarak insists Palestinian, Iraqi Solutions Linked,” Washington Times, April 14, 2004.
Depiction of Israel and Jews in the Egyptian Media.  Egypt, like other
Arab states, has received much criticism for allowing state-owned media outlets to
publish unsubstantiated conspiratorial theories regarding Israel and the Jewish
people, which likely contribute to detrimental or negative views of Israel by the
Egyptian people. Although some Egyptian intellectuals have called for an end to anti-
Israeli incitement, Egyptian publications continue to publish stories that perpetuate
allegations of Jewish involvement in blood libels, deny the existence of the
Holocaust, and portray anti-Semitic publications, such as the Protocols of the Elders
of Zion, as truth.22 U.S. officials and Members of Congress have urged the Egyptian
government to speak out against anti-Semitism in media and society. Egyptian
officials claim that they do not control the “free press.”
Iraq
Egyptian Position on the 2003 Iraq War. The Egyptian public’s
opposition to the Iraq war precluded the government from publicly supporting the
United States. Egypt advised against the March 2003 U.S. intervention in Iraq and
continues to question an extended presence of U.S. forces there. In response to U.S.
efforts to secure Arab participation in stabilizing Iraq, Egypt informed the United
States that it would not participate in any international security arrangements
involving force deployments in Iraq unless they were under United Nations
auspices.23 In the past, Egypt did cooperate with U.S.-led international military and
peacekeeping operations, such as the 1991 Kuwaiti liberation, Operation Restore
Hope in Somalia, Afghanistan,24 and the Balkans. Egypt has allowed U.S. overflights
and waived the 30-day prior notification to pass nuclear-armed U.S. warships through
the Suez canal. At a June 2005 conference on Iraq reconstruction, Iraqi Foreign
Minister Hoshyar Zebari announced that Egypt and Jordan were the first Arab
countries sending ambassadors to Iraq. In July 2005, Egypt’s top diplomat in Iraq was
kidnaped by terrorists and executed several days later. 
Training Iraqi Security Forces. Egypt has been active in helping to train
Iraq’s new security forces, and some U.S. lawmakers have demanded that the
Administration further utilize Egypt’s offer of assistance.25 In late 2004, an Iraqi
infantry company was invited to Egypt to participate in a joint training program with
the Egyptian army. According to the Egyptian government, 134 soldiers from Iraq’s
5th Infantry Division trained alongside Egypt’s 3rd Infantry Division at the Mubarak
Military City in northern Egypt. No plans for future joint Iraqi-Egyptian training
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28 Experts note that Jamaah and Al Jihad members who fled Egypt never renounced the use
of violence against the Egyptian government, as both groups ultimately merged with Al
Qaeda. Ayman Al-Zawahiri, the leader of Al Jihad, has long been known as Al Qaeda’s
“second-in-command” to Osama bin Laden.  See “Jihad Militant Leader Calls for Change
to Non-violence,” Dow Jones Newswires, February 6, 2000. 
exercises have been announced, although Egyptian officials have expressed their
willingness to expand their training program for Iraqi military officers.26
Terrorism
Egyptian security forces have long been engaged in their own war on terror
against several radical Islamic groups, that have called for the violent overthrow of
Egypt’s secular government and its replacement with an Islamic state. Two radical
offshoots of the aforementioned Muslim Brotherhood, the Jamaah  Islamiya (Islamic
Group) and Al Jihad,27 have been responsible for  several attacks on high-ranking
Egyptian officials, including Al Jihad’s 1981 assassination of President Anwar Sadat
and Jamaah  Islamiya’s 1990 killing of the speaker of the Egyptian People’s
Assembly. Both groups also have attacked tourist sites popular with Western visitors,
bombed Coptic Christian churches, and attacked Egyptian banks and other centers
of commerce.  The Islamic Group also has a non-violent arm which recruits and
builds support openly in poor neighborhoods in Cairo, Alexandria, and throughout
southern Egypt, and runs social service programs. Al Jihad has operated only
clandestinely, focusing almost exclusively on assassinations. 
1992-1997 Terror Campaign. Jamaah  Islamiya  began a terror campaign in
1992 that in six years resulted in 1,300 deaths (90 of whom were foreign tourists) and
several thousand injuries. The group also assassinated several Egyptian officials.  The
government responded with an all-out campaign that included what some viewed as
harsh measures that abused human rights. Egyptian authorities used arrest, search,
and seizure without warrant, detention without trial,  conviction without appeal, and,
according to some, physical torture in their drive to stop the Jamaah  terrorists. Some
Egyptians defend the use of such measures as necessary to eliminate terrorists and
stop terrorism from threatening an even larger segment of the Egyptian populace.
President Mubarak and other Egyptian officials claimed that the extremists were
financed, trained, and directed by Iranian and Sudanese religious militants and
returning Egyptian volunteers from the Soviet-Afghan war. 
Jamaah leaders inside Egypt announced in 1997 and again in1998 that they were
ending the armed attacks.28 In the interim, six men claiming to be Jamaah members
attacked tourists at the Hatshepsut tomb near Luxor in southern Egypt in November
1997, killing 58 foreign tourists and four Egyptians before committing suicide.
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Previously, Jamaah  members involved in terror attacks tried to escape and did not
commit suicide, which led to some speculation that the Luxor attack was the
desperate act of a few members rather than an action of the whole group. There have
been no major incidents involving Jamaah since the Luxor attack and in June 2000,
Jamaah leaders inside Egypt repeated their claim that they had abandoned violence
and terrorism. Some observers suggest that harsh and persistent police pressure has
greatly reduced if not eliminated the Jamaah threat to Egypt.  
Recent Terrorist Activity in Egypt.  Over the past two years, there has been
a resumption of terrorist activity in Egypt, in what some suggest could be a revival
of earlier, more violent periods. 
! In October 2004, bombs exploded at two major resorts that cater to
Israelis and other Western tourists in the Sinai Peninsula, 34 people
were killed and over 120 were wounded in the attack.
! On April 7, 2005, an explosion in the Khan al-Khalili market area of
Cairo killed three, including one U.S. citizen.  A group called the al-
Ezz Islamic Brigade claimed responsibility for the attack.
! On April 30, 2005, a man exploded a suicide bomb near the
Egyptian museum while being pursued by police, wounding seven;
and two women, the fiancé and sister of the suicide bomber, fired at
a tourist bus before committing suicide.  No one was injured in the
bus attack.  Two groups claimed responsibility for the attacks, but
neither claim was confirmed.
! On July 23, 2005, two car bombs and a set of explosives concealed
in a backpack exploded at various tourist destinations in the
Egyptian resort town of Sharm al-Shaykh. As many as 88 people,
including one American, were killed in the blasts. Investigations into
the attacks have focused on the possible link to a local terrorist cell
who may have committed the October 2004 bombings.
! On April 24, 2006, Egyptian terrorists attacked the Sinai Peninsula
resort town of Dahab, killing 21 people and injuring hundreds. Two
days later, suicide bombers attacked a police station in the northern
Sinai and a base camp of the Multinational Force and Observers, a
peacekeeping mission that was created as part of the 1979 peace
treaty between Egypt and Israel. Two people were injured in the
attacks. 
Egypt has suffered through a new wave of attacks emanating from previously
unknown groups in the Sinai Peninsula. After each attack, Egyptian authorities
identified some of the perpetrators as members of local Bedouin tribes. Egyptian
security forces have launched several operations in the Sinai and have arrested
hundreds of Bedouin suspects, leading some to speculate that police heavy-
handedness may be further exacerbating tensions between Bedouin and the state.
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Figure 2.  The Sinai Peninsula
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29 On March 23, 2006, Egyptian Prime Minister Ahmad Nazif announced to Parliament that
the government would abrogate the 25-year old Emergency Laws and replace them with new
anti-terror legislation. At this time, it is unclear how such proposed legislation would differ
from existing law.  
The extent of outside involvement in the recent wave of terrorism in Egypt is
still uncertain. The Bedouin/Palestinian terrorist network in the Sinai that has
claimed credit for the bombings in Dahab, Sharm al-Shaykh, and Taba calls itself
Al-Tawhid w’al-Jihad. Israeli officials have suggested that Al Qaeda or another
international group operating in the Sinai may have supported the Bedouin
operatives. Egyptian intelligence officials have publicly stated that some members
of Al-Tawhid w’al-Jihad were sent to the Gaza Strip to receive training from Hamas.
Other observers discount the possibility of outside involvement and believe that the
Bedouin, who have historically kept their distance from the state, have grown
frustrated with poor living conditions in the Sinai and sought revenge for the mass
detentions that followed the October 2004 bombings. Some experts postulate that,
although the terrorists may have acted on their own, members of Al-Tawhid w’al-
Jihad may have drawn their inspiration from Al Qaeda.
Political and Economic Reform in Egypt
Overview.  International and domestic pressure for reform in Egypt reached
an apex in 2005, as Egyptian civil society groups and Islamist activists held a number
of anti-government demonstrations calling for greater political freedom in Egypt.
U.S. officials, including Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, also called on Egypt
to abrogate draconian emergency laws,29 hold free and fair elections, and reform its
Constitution. At the same time, the political elite of Egypt, recognizing that its
popular support was on the decline and President Mubarak’s health was questionable,
was undergoing its own internal reformation in order to modernize the ruling
National Democratic Party’s (NDP) image and restore its popular appeal and
credibility. With pressure coming from both outside and within the ruling clique,
President Mubarak took action in February 2005 by launching a process to amend
Egypt’s Constitution to allow for multi-candidate presidential elections for the first
time in its history.  
For a complete overview of the recent presidential and parliamentary elections
and their implications for U.S. policy toward Egypt and U.S. efforts to promote
democracy in the region, see CRS Report RS22274, Egypt: 2005 Presidential and
Parliamentary Elections, by Jeremy M. Sharp. 
Despite vibrant campaign seasons for both presidential and parliamentary
elections in 2005, the results, which saw President Mubarak receiving 88% of the
popular vote and the NDP maintaining its supra-majority in parliament, led many
analysts to conclude that the elections had been merely a symbolic show of reform
and that the underlying power structure in Egypt remains firmly intact. Though
Muslim Brotherhood affiliates made noticeable gains during parliamentary elections,
the organization remains outlawed and, by law, cannot field a candidate in any future
presidential election. Furthermore, with the election season concluded, the
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government has cracked down on reformists, journalists, and independent judges in
2006.
U.S. Policy to Promote Reform in Egypt .  Although the United States has
long advocated the promotion of human rights and political freedom in Egypt, most
experts agree that, prior to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, economic
reform superseded political reform in the West’s relations with Egypt.  However,
with the recent push for democracy in the Middle East seen as a counterweight to
Islamic militancy and intellectual and social stagnation, U.S. policy regarding Egypt
has been reinvigorated, as policymakers seek to balance U.S. security interests with
U.S. democracy promotion policies. 
U.S. officials have employed a variety of diplomatic tools to push for reform in
Egypt, including speeches on democratization given by high level visiting officials
such as Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, foreign aid to pro-democracy
organizations to assist local efforts to monitor elections and train activists, and
withholding U.S.-Egyptian free trade talks as a protest to the recent conviction of
Ayman Nour. 
Nevertheless, some analysts have questioned the depth of the U.S. commitment
to democratization in Egypt, particularly after the recent Hamas victory in Palestinian
parliamentary elections earlier this year. With Hamas poised to take over most of the
Palestinian Authority, Egypt, the United States, and Israel all have a shared purpose
in containing Hamas and the spread of political Islamist influence into neighboring
states. In this changed atmosphere, in which Egyptian security cooperation on the
Gaza-Egyptian border also is valued, some observers have speculated that U.S. policy
makers may tone down their rhetoric on reform in Egypt. 
Through annual foreign operations and State Department appropriations
legislation, Congress provides funding for reform in Egypt through the following
programs: the United States Agency for International Development’s (USAID) Egypt
Office;30 the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI), a State Department program
designed to encourage reform in Arab countries by strengthening Arab civil society,
encouraging micro-enterprise, expanding political participation, and promoting
women’s rights;31 the State Department’s Human Rights and Democracy Fund
(HRDF), an account that funds human rights promotion in Muslim-majority
countries; and the National Endowment for Democracy’s (NED) Muslim Democracy
Program. 
 Many in the Egyptian government appear to feel threatened by the current thrust
of U.S. policy and resist some U.S. advocated changes that seek to empower
opposition movements. In June 2006, the Egyptian government accused the local
head of the International Republican Institute’s (IRI) Egypt program of meddling in
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Egypt’s internal affairs and demanded that the organization temporarily halt its
activities there.
Congress seeks to ensure that U.S. foreign assistance for Egypt is being
appropriately used to promote reform.  In conference report language accompanying
P.L. 108-447, the FY2005 Consolidated Appropriations Act, conferees specified that
“democracy and governance activities shall not be subject to the prior approval of the
GoE [government of Egypt].  The managers intend this language to include NGOs
and other segments of civil society that may not be registered with, or officially
recognized by, the GoE.  However, the managers understand that the GoE should be
kept informed of funding provided pursuant to these activities.”32 
Economic Reform. As a developing country with the largest population (and
the second largest economy) in the Arab world, Egypt faces a number of economic
and environmental challenges, including a lack of arable land, high unemployment,
rampant corruption, rapid urbanization, and extreme poverty (30% of the population
lives below the poverty line). Egypt’s economy revolves around several sectors: the
state; the production of oil and natural gas; the tourism industry; remittances from
over 2 million Egyptians working abroad; revenues from the Suez Canal; agriculture;
clothing and textile manufacturing; pharmaceuticals; and foreign aid. Since the early
years of Anwar Sadat’s rule, Egypt has been evolving from a centrally controlled,
socialist economy to a free market, capitalist society — a gradual process that has
created difficult decisions for the Egyptian government, income inequality, and
hardships for the Egyptian people.33
In order to increase foreign investment and qualify for development loans from
international lending institutions, Egypt has had to demonstrate that it is making
tangible progress in liberalizing its economy. In recent years, the government has
reduced public subsidies for basic foodstuffs, privatized many state-owned
corporations, and removed trade barriers.34 Although analysts remain cautious as to
what effect reforms may have on the economy, the government has recently
streamlined the tax system, canceled many customs duties, and forced smaller banks
to merge with the country’s four largest banks. 
Corruption.  Egypt, like other developing nations, has struggled to overcome
high levels of corruption, which many analysts consider the biggest obstacle to
achieving economic growth. Corruption in Egypt is found in all sectors of the
government as, in recent years, a number of high level officials (including several
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former ministers) has been indicted for fraud and influence peddling. Moreover,
Egypt’s bloated, cumbersome bureaucracy is infamous for making bribery a common
practice, as poorly-paid government workers seek additional money and citizens seek
ways to circumvent the maze of public regulations and overlapping agencies. Some
analysts believe that the corruption issue enhances the popularity of the Muslim
Brotherhood, which frequently invokes Islam to rally against the moral corruption in
society. The Egyptian press also has been active in exposing corruption scandals. 
U.S.-Egyptian Trade 
Trade Overview.  The United States is Egypt’s largest bilateral trading
partner, while Egypt is the United States’ 54th largest trading partner.35 According to
the Department of Commerce’s 2004 Country Commercial Guide for Egypt, Egypt
is the largest single market worldwide for American wheat and is a significant
importer of other agricultural commodities, machinery, and equipment.36 The United
States also is the second largest foreign investor in Egypt, primarily in the oil and gas
sector.
Table 1.  U.S.-Egyptian Trade Statistics 2004
Selected commodities $ amount (estimated)





U.S. Imports from Egypt ($1.3 billion total  in 2004)
Apparel $422 million
Mineral Fuel, Oil $262 million
Iron & Steel $254 million
Source:  Trade Stat Express, U.S. Department of Commerce.
Since the mid-1990s, Egyptian officials have sought to negotiate a free trade
agreement (FTA) with the United States, claiming that an Egyptian-American FTA
could boost Egypt’s economy by as much as 3%.  The two parties signed a Trade and
Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) in 1999. The TIFA  established a Council
on Trade and Investment (TIFA Council) composed of representatives of both
governments and chaired by the United States Trade Representative (USTR) and
Egypt’s Minister of Economy and Foreign Trade.  However, on January 17, 2006, the
New York Times reported that the United States had put on hold its intention to
announce free trade talks with Egypt. The decision to table such an announcement
was reportedly done in protest to the sentencing of secular opposition figure Ayman
Nour to five years in prison for his alleged fraud in registering his political party.
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Nour, who placed second in Egypt’s 2005 presidential election, is appealing the
decision and remains in prison.  In October 2005, Rob Portman, the United States
trade representative, had told Congress that the Administration was considering
negotiating trade agreements with Egypt and three other Middle Eastern countries.
In 1996, Congress authorized the creation of Qualified Industrial Zones (QIZ)
in order to entitle goods jointly produced by Israel and either Jordan or Egypt to enter
the United States duty free.37 In December 2004, Egypt finally reached an agreement
with Israel to designate several Qualified Industrial Zones (QIZ) in Egypt under the
mandate of the U.S.-Israeli Free Trade Agreement. Goods produced in Egyptian QIZs
allow Egyptian-made products to be exported to the United States duty-free if the
products contain at least 11.7% input from Israel. On November 1, 2005, the USTR
designated a new Qualified Industrial Zone (QIZ) in the central Nile delta region,
bringing the total number of QIZs in Egypt to four.
Human Rights, Religious Freedom, and Women’s Rights
Egypt consistently ranks poorly in its human rights record, as the U.S. State
Department and international human rights organizations have long documented
instances of torture, arbitrary detainment, and discrimination against women,
homosexuals, and Coptic Christians.  According to Human Rights Watch, Egyptian
security forces and police routinely torture and mistreat detainees, particularly during
interrogations.  The government has long restricted freedom of assembly, though
recent opposition protests have been permitted and, in some cases, police were absent
from public demonstrations. In recent years, press freedom and general freedom of
speech have expanded in Egypt, though legal restrictions, such as a 1996 press law
which can lead to jail terms for journalists convicted of defamation, continue to foster
a high degree of self-censorship in the media. However, Arab satellite televisions,
like Al Jazeera and others, have challenged Egyptian state-owned media by
broadcasting, among other programs, opposition demonstrations and interviews with
Muslim Brotherhood members.
The 1981 Emergency Laws. After Islamic militants assassinated former
President Anwar Sadat in 1981, officials reinstated a set of laws granting the state
and security forces sweeping powers in order to curb the outbreak of further violence.
Over time, these laws, which were extended for three years in February 2003, have
come under heavy scrutiny from reformers and human rights advocates for their
arbitrary application to non-security cases. In 2006, the Egyptian government
announced its intention to abrogate these laws and replace them with new anti-
terrorism legislation. According to the 2004 State Department Report on Human
Rights Practices in Egypt, the Emergency Laws:
! authorize incommunicado detention for prolonged periods,
! restrict or deny access to counsel for detainees in state security
facilities,
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! permit the state to refer any criminal case to the Emergency Courts,
in which the accused does not receive most of the constitutional
protections of the civilian judicial system,
! suspend the constitutional provisions regarding the right to privacy.
Religious Freedom.  There is no official government policy of discrimination
against the 9 million Coptic Christians in Egypt, and the Constitution provides for
equal rights without regard to religion. Nevertheless, critics note that there are no
Christians serving as governors, police commissioners, city mayors, public university
presidents, or deans.38 Converts to Christianity in Egypt may face bureaucratic
obstacles in registering their new religious status with the state. In addition, there
have been reports of periodic discrimination against small minority communities of
Baha’is, Shiites, and Jews (200 remain in Egypt). In an effort to promote tolerance,
President Mubarak in December 2003 recognized the Coptic Christmas, January 6,
as a national holiday.
Despite government efforts to improve Muslim-Christian relations, a number
of obstacles remain.  For example, the 10 articles of “Humayun,” or the Humayun
Code, a portion of Ottoman legislation from 1856, still controls the building or repair
of churches in Egypt and is a source of great aggravation to Coptic Christians.  Under
this law, a license is required to erect a church.  In addition, there are ten restricting
conditions for the construction of churches, including a minimum distance between
churches and between a church and the nearest mosque, as well as the absence of
objection on the part of Muslim neighbors.  In December 2004,  President Mubarak
issued a new decree that devolved church repair and reconstruction decisions to the
provincial level and stipulated that churches would be permitted to proceed with
rebuilding and repair without legal hindrance.  However, permits for construction of
new churches require a presidential decree. 
On April 14, 2006, clashes broke out between Muslims and Coptic Christians
in Alexandria, Egypt after a Muslim man attacked Christian worshipers with a
machete at three churches during Palm Sunday services. The rioting continued for
three days after the initial attack, though religious leaders organized peaceful
demonstrations to help quell the violence. The sectarian violence was the latest
manifestation of growing Muslim-Christian tension in Egypt, which has seen several
similar incidents over the past two years.  
Women’s Rights. Although Egyptian women have played major roles in the
country’s drive for independence and many women currently serve in prestigious
public posts, women face a number of obstacles at the legal, religious, and cultural
levels. For example, according to the U.S. State Department’s 2004 Human Rights
Report on Egypt, female genital mutilation (FGM) remained a serious problem due
to widespread cultural acceptance, despite the government’s attempts to eliminate the
practice.39 Moreover, personal status laws governing marriage, divorce, custody, and
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inheritance discriminate against women, particularly when it comes to divorce, as
there is much societal resistance to breaking up the family unit. Domestic violence
also is a major issue, as some estimate that as many as a third of all married Egyptian
women have faced some form of physical abuse.40 In recent years, new non-
governmental organizations have started to provide services and counseling to
women, who may be too afraid to go to the authorities. 
Military Cooperation
“Bright Star” and other Joint Military Operations. The United States
and Egypt conducted the first “Bright Star” joint military exercise in August 1983,
and continue to hold periodic “Bright Star” exercises for infantry, airborne, artillery,
and armored forces. The 1983 Bright Star was more than a training exercise:
President Mubarak asked the United States to send Airborne Warning and Control
System aircraft (AWACS) to monitor Libya’s activity toward Sudan in February
1983. President Reagan sent AWACS planes and crews to monitor Libyan flights and
the AWACS remained to take part in the first Bright Star. AWACS returned to Egypt
in March-April 1984 to monitor Libyan flights toward Sudan after an incident in
which a Libyan plane allegedly bombed Khartoum. On August 11, 2003, the United
States announced that it was canceling the October 2003 Bright Star exercise because
U.S. armed forces were over-committed in Afghanistan, Iraq, and other areas. In
2005, Bright Star exercises took place in Egypt with over 9,000 U.S. troops
reportedly participating. 
“Desert Storm”.  In the week prior to the August 2, 1990, Iraqi invasion of
Kuwait, President Mubarak traveled to Iraq, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia in an attempt
to negotiate a peaceful end to the crisis. After the invasion, Mubarak advised
President Bush to withhold sending armed forces to allow Egypt more time to work
out a peaceful resolution. On August 7, when the United States announced that it was
deploying troops to Saudi Arabia, Mubarak denied a U.S. request to allow U.S.
forces use of Egyptian military bases on their way to the Arabian Peninsula so that
he would have time to negotiate (he later granted the request). Mubarak and other
Egyptian officials continued their peacemaking efforts in the Arab League, the
Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), and through personal contacts and
visits with Arab leaders. On August 10, Egypt voted for an Arab League resolution
to send armed forces to defend Saudi Arabia against a possible Iraqi invasion. The
first contingent of Egyptian troops, a commando unit and a paratrooper unit, joined
U.S. forces along the Saudi-Kuwaiti border the next day, on August 11. Egypt stated
that its forces would assist in liberating Kuwait but would not attack or occupy Iraq.
In February 1991, an Egyptian reinforced infantry division of some 30,000 troops
took part in Desert Storm, advancing into western Kuwait in a corridor between U.S.
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Marines to the east and U.S. Army forces to the west in Iraq. Egypt suffered 9 killed
and 74 wounded in action in Desert Storm.41 
Egyptian and U.S. military officers state that cooperation in Bright Star
exercises facilitated the U.S.-Egyptian cooperation and military compatibility in
Desert Storm, and Egyptian officers claim that Bright Star and Desert Storm serve
as precedents for future U.S.-Egyptian cooperative ventures. Moreover, Egyptian
participation in Desert Storm provided benefit to the U.S.-led operation in that it
helped broaden the allied coalition that liberated Kuwait. Later, Egyptian troops
served as peacekeeping forces in Somalia and Yugoslavia.
Egyptian Participation in International Peacekeeping. In the Sudan,
Egypt has provided soldiers for peacekeeping operations in southern Sudan. Egypt
has sent relief supplies and police forces to the strife-ridden Darfur region to bolster
humanitarian efforts there. In Afghanistan, Egypt maintains a field hospital at
Bagram Air Base.  
Intelligence Cooperation. Although it is difficult to discern the extent of
U.S.-Egyptian intelligence cooperation, there is a sense among many U.S. security
officials that Egypt’s long struggle against domestic Islamic radicals has made it a
valuable partner in the global war on terrorism. Since the September 11, 2001
terrorist attacks, there have been several reports suggesting that the U.S. Central
Intelligence Agency has deported several suspected Al Qaeda operatives to Egypt
(along with other Arab countries) in order to be interrogated.42  In May, Egyptian
Prime Minister Ahmed Nazif said the United States has dispatched 60 to 70 Egyptian
detainees to their home country since the September 11 attacks.43 More recently, an
Italian prosecutor has asked a judge to issue arrest warrants for 13 Americans
accused of kidnaping an Egyptian cleric off the streets of Milan and bringing him to
Egypt in 2003. The cleric reportedly has been held in prison for more than two years
without formal charges, though Egyptian officials have accused him of having ties
to Jamaah Islamiya.44 
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U.S. Foreign Assistance to Egypt
Since 1979, Egypt has been the second largest recipient, after Israel, of U.S.
foreign assistance, receiving an annual average of over $2 billion in economic and
military aid. Congress typically earmarks foreign assistance for Egypt in the foreign
operations appropriations bill. The annual earmark has included a statement that
Egypt should undertake further economic reforms in addition to reforms taken in
previous years. 
Economic Aid
Annual bilateral economic assistance to Egypt is typically provided in three
different ways: (1) as a direct cash transfer to the Egyptian government; (2) as part
of the Commodity Import Program, which provides hard currency to the Egyptian
private sector to purchase U.S. agricultural goods; and (3) as funds for USAID
programming in Egypt. In recent years, Congress has sought to specify how Egypt’s
economic aid would be spent, prioritizing funding for USAID’s democracy and
education programs. Egypt claims that U.S. assistance programs must be jointly
negotiated and cannot be unilaterally dictated by the United States. 
As part of the FY2007 request, USAID plans on spending $255 million in ESF.
The Administration intends to provide $183 million of Egypt’s $455 million total
ESF package as a direct cash transfer. There is no request for CIP funds in the
FY2007 Administration budget.
U.S. economic assistance to Egypt has been decreasing since 1998, when the
United States began reducing economic assistance to Egypt and Israel. In January
1998, Israeli officials negotiated with the United States to reduce economic aid and
increase military aid over a 10-year period. A 3 to 2 ratio similar to U.S. aid to Israel
and Egypt was applied to the reduction in aid ($60 million reduction for Israel and
$40 million reduction for Egypt), but Egypt has not received an increase in military
assistance. Economic aid has dropped in annual $40 million increments from $815
million in FY1998 to $455 million in ESF for the FY2007 request.45 
The cash transfer portion of annual ESF to Egypt is conditioned on Egyptian
efforts to implement necessary economic reforms. USAID has withheld the
disbursement of several hundred million dollars in ESF to Egypt until certain
benchmarks have been met. These benchmarks were outlined in a March 2005
financial sector reform agreement between USAID and the Egyptian government. 
Military Aid 
The Administration has requested $1.3 billion in FMF for Egypt in FY2007 —
the same amount it received in FY2006. FMF aid to Egypt is divided into three
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general components: (1) acquisitions, (2) upgrades to existing equipment, and (3)
follow-on support/ maintenance contracts.  According to the General Accountability
Office, over the life of Egypt’s FMF program, Egypt has purchased 36 Apache
helicopters, 220 F-16 aircraft, 880 M1A1 tanks, and the accompanying training and
maintenance to support these systems, among other items.46  According to the U.S.
and Egyptian defense officials, approximately 30% of annual FMF aid to Egypt is
spent on new weapons systems, as Egypt’s defense modernization plan is designed
to gradually replace most of Egypt’s older Soviet weaponry with U.S. equipment.
That figure is expected to decline over the long term due to the rising costs associated
with follow-on maintenance contracts. Egyptian military officials have repeatedly
sought additional FMF funds to offset the escalating costs of follow-on support.
Egypt is currently committed to payments on a multi-billion dollar arms sale
involving the purchase of U.S. F-16 aircraft, M-1 tanks, and a Patriot missile battery.
Egypt also receives Excess Defense Articles (EDA) worth hundreds of millions of
dollars annually from the Pentagon. Egyptian officers also participate in the IMET
program ($1.2 million requested for FY2007) in order to facilitate U.S.-Egyptian
military cooperation over the long term.
In addition to large amounts of annual U.S. military assistance, Egypt also
benefits from certain aid provisions that are available to only a few other countries.
Since 2000, Egypt’s FMF funds have been deposited in an interest bearing account
in the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and have remained there until they are
obligated. By law (P.L. 106-280), Congress must be notified if any of the interest
accrued in this account is obligated.  Most importantly, Egypt is allowed to set aside
FMF funds for current year payments only, rather than set aside the full amount
needed to meet the full cost of multi-year purchases. Cash flow financing allows
Egypt to negotiate major arms purchases with U.S. defense suppliers. 
Recent U.S. Military Sales to Egypt.  As stated earlier, Egypt uses its FMF
funds to purchase U.S. defense equipment. By law, Congress must be notified of any
new purchase agreement. Israel has protested U.S. sales of certain military
technologies to Egypt; the Egyptians insist that all U.S. weaponry is used for
defensive purposes and is intended to upgrade or replace its aging Soviet hardware.
The Department of Defense’s Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), is
charged with managing U.S. arms sales to Egypt.  Recent sales include one reported
on July 29, 2005, when the Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress
of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Egypt of 200 M109A5 155mm self-propelled
howitzers as well as associated equipment and services.  The total value, if all
options are exercised, could be as high as $181 million. 
FY2006 Foreign Operations Appropriations Bill
The conference report (H.Rept. 109-265) on H.R. 3057, the FY2006 Foreign
Operations Appropriations Bill, provides the full request for Egypt ($495 million in
ESF, $1.43 billion in FMF); however, it designates $100 million in economic aid for
USAID education and democracy and governance programming and conditions
another $227.6 million on economic reform benchmarks set out in a March 2005
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memorandum of understanding between the United States and Egypt. In addition,
conferees stated that “not less than 50 percent of the funds for democracy,
governance and human rights be provided through non-governmental organizations
for the purpose of strengthening Egyptian civil society organizations, enhancing their
participation in the political process and their ability to promote and monitor human
rights.”47 Finally, conferees did not include a Senate provision conditioning U.S.
assistance to Egypt on the construction of an FM transmitter tower for Radio Sawa.
U.S. Assistance to Egypt:  Possible Changes
Some lawmakers believe that U.S. assistance to Egypt has not been effective in
promoting political and economic reform and that foreign assistance agreements must
be renegotiated to include benchmarks that Egypt must meet to continue to qualify
for U.S. foreign aid. Others have periodically called for restrictions on U.S. aid to
Egypt on the grounds that Egypt indirectly supports Palestinian terrorism, suppresses
its own population, including minority Christians, and continues to allow Egyptian
state-owned media outlets to publish unsubstantiated conspiracy theories regarding
Israel and the Jewish people. 
The Administration and Egyptian government assert that reducing Egypt’s
military aid would undercut peace between Israel and Egypt. Overall, many U.S.
observers believe that U.S. support for Egypt stabilizes the region and extends U.S.
influence in the most populous Arab country. Supporters of continued U.S. assistance
note that Egypt helps train Iraqi and Palestinian security forces, cooperates with the
U.S. military, provides access and facilities to U.S. forces in the Middle East, and is
helping patrol the Egyptian-Gaza border after Israel’s 2005 withdrawal from the Gaza
Strip. 
For years, Congress has specified in annual foreign operations appropriations
legislation that ESF funds to Egypt are provided with the understanding that Egypt
undertake certain economic reforms and liberalize its economy. USAID believes that
its programs have helped contribute to Egypt’s economic growth and macroeconomic
stability. Others note that Egypt still has a bloated public sector, and assert that U.S.
economic aid mainly helps subsidize Egypt’s social welfare and education budget.
U.S. policymakers have repeatedly suggested that trade with and investment in Egypt
may be as effective as aid in reforming the Egyptian economy. In 1994, then-Vice
President Al Gore and Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak launched the United
States-Egyptian Partnership for Economic Growth and Development, a council of
private and public sector officials dedicated to enhancing trade between the two
countries. The United States has withheld announcing its intention to launch U.S.-
Egyptian free trade negotiations . Some have speculated that this has been in response
to the December 2005 prosecution of Ayman Nour, the runner-up in the 2005
presidential election. 
Legislative Proposals and Congressional Action on Aid to Egypt.
An amendment offered on July 15, 2004, to the House FY2005 foreign operations
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bill (H.R. 4818) would have reduced U.S. military aid to Egypt by $570 million and
increased economic aid by the same amount, but the amendment failed by a vote of
131 to 287. An amendment offered on June 28, 2005, to the House FY2006 foreign
operations bill (H.R. 3057) would have reduced U.S. military aid to Egypt by $750
million and would have transferred that amount to child survival and health programs
managed by USAID. The amendment failed by a recorded vote of 87 to 326. 
The FY2005 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 108-447) stipulates that
U.S. funds for democracy and governance activities in Egypt are no longer subject
to the prior approval of the Egyptian government. At this point, it is unclear how this
provision will affect USAID programming in Egypt. USAID completed a $32 million
NGO Service Center in order to facilitate the growth of independent, non-
governmental organizations in Egypt. 
H.R. 2601, the FY2006/FY2007 House Foreign Relations Authorization bill,
would reduce U.S. military assistance to Egypt by $40 million for each of the next
three fiscal years, while using the funds to promote economic changes, fight poverty,
and improve education in Egypt. There is no comparable provision in the Senate’s
Foreign Relations Authorization bill (S. 600).
On May 25, 2006, the House Appropriations Committee in a voice vote rejected
an amendment to cut $200 million in military aid to Egypt during markup of H.R.
5522, the FY2007 Foreign Operations Appropriations Bill.  In June 2006, the House
narrowly defeated an amendment (198-225) to H.R. 5522 that would have
reallocated $100 million in economic aid to Egypt and used it instead to fight AIDS
worldwide and to assist the Darfur region of Sudan. Many supporters of the
amendment were dismayed by the Egyptian government’s spring 2006 crackdown on
pro-democracy activists in Cairo. 
Table 2.  Recent U.S. Aid to Egypt
(millions of dollars)
Year Economic Military IMET Total
1948-1997 23,288.6 22,353.5 27.3 45,669.4
1998 815.0 1,300.0 1.0 2,116.0
1999 775.0 1,300.0 1.0 2,076.0
2000 727.3 1,300.0 1.0 2,028.3
2001 695.0 1,300.0 1.0 1,996.0
2002 655.0 1,300.0 1.0 1,956.0
2003 911.0 1,300.0 1.2 2,212.2
2004 571.6 1,292.3 1.4 1,865.3
2005 530.7 1,289.6 1.2 1,821.5
2006 490.0 1,287.0 1.2 1,778.2
Total 29,459.2 34,022.4 37.3 63,518.9
Note:  FY2004 totals reflect the .59% across-the-board reduction.
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Grant P.L. 480 I P.L. 480 II
1946 9.6  —  —  — 
9.3 Surplus
0.3 UNWRA
 —  —  —  —  —  — 
1948 1.4  —  —  — 1.4 Surplus  —  —  —  —  —  — 
1951 0.1  —  —  — 0.1 Tech Asst  —  —  —  —  —  — 
1952 1.2  —  —  —  —  — 0.4  —  —  — 0.8
1953 12.9  —  —  —  —  — 12.9  —  —  —  — 
1954 4  —  —  —  —  — 3.3  —  —  — 0.7
1955 66.3  —  —  —  — 7.5 35.3  —  —  — 23.5
1956 33.3  —  —  —  —  — 2.6  —  — 13.2 17.5
1957 1  —  —  —  —  — 0.7  —  —  — 0.3
1958 0.6  —  —  —  —  — 0  —  —  — 0.6
1959 44.8  —  —  —  —  — 2  —  — 33.9 8.9
1960 65.9  —  —  —  — 15.4 5.7  —  — 36.6 8.2
1961 73.5  —  —  —  —  — 2.3  —  — 48.6 22.6
1962 200.5  —  —  —  — 20 2.2 20  — 114 44.3
1963 146.7  —  —  —  — 36.3 2.3 10  — 78.5 19.6
1964 95.5  —  —  —  —  — 1.4  —  — 85.2 8.9
1965 97.6  —  —  —  —  — 2.3  —  — 84.9 10.4
1966 27.6  —  —  —  —  — 1.5  —  — 16.4 9.7
1967 12.6  —  —  —  —  — 0.8  —  —  — 11.8
1972 1.5  —  —  —  — 1.5  —  —  —  —  — 
1973 0.8  —  —  —  —  —  —  —  —  — 0.8
1974 21.3  —  —  —  —  —  —  — 8.5 9.5 3.3
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Grant P.L. 480 I P.L. 480 II
1975 370.1  —  —  —  —  —  — 194.3 58.5 104.5 12.8
1976 464.3  —  —  —  —  — 5.4 150 102.8 201.7 4.4
TQ 552.5  —  —  —  —  —  — 429 107.8 14.6 1.1
1977 907.8  —  —  —  —  —  — 600 99.2 196.8 11.7
1978 943.2  —  — 0.2 0.1 Narc.  —  — 617.4 133.3 179.7 12.5
1979 2588.5 1500  — 0.4  —  —  — 250 585 230.7 22.4
1980 1167.3  —  — 0.8  —  —  — 280 585 285.3 16.1
1981 1681.2 550  — 0.8  —  —  — 70 759 272.5 28.9
1982 1967.3 700 200 2.4  —  —  —  — 771 262 31.9
1983 2332 900 425 1.9  —  —  —  — 750 238.3 16.8
1984 2470.8 900 465 1.7  —  —  —  — 852.9 237.5 13.7
1985 2468.7  — 1175 1.7  —  —  —  — 1065.1 213.8 13.2
1986 2539.1  — 1244.1 1.7  —  —  —  — 1069.2 217.5 6.6
1987 2317  — 1300 1.8  —  —  —  — 819.7 191.7 3.9
1988 2174.9  — 1300 1.5  —  —  —  — 717.8 153 2.6
1989 2269.6  — 1300 1.5  —  — 1.5  — 815 150.5 1.2
1990 2397.4  — 1294.4 1.6  —  —  —  — 898.4 203  — 
1991 2300.2  — 1300 1.9  —  —  —  — 780.8 165 52.5
1992 2235.1  — 1300 1.8  —  —  —  — 892.9 40.4  — 
1993 2052.9  — 1300 1.8  —  —  —  — 747.0  — 4.1
1994 1868.6  — 1300 0.8  —  —  —  — 561.6 35 6.2
1995 2414.5  — 1300 1  —  — 0.2  — 1113.3  —  — 
1996 2116.6  — 1300 1  —  —  —  — 815  — 0.6
1997P 2116  — 1300 1  —  —  —  — 815  —  — 
Total 45669.4 4550 17803.5 27.3.0 11.2 80.7 82.8 2620.7 15923.8 4,114.3 455.1
CRS-33
Notes:  Totals may not add due to rounding.  No U.S. aid programs for years 1947, 1949, 1950, 1968, 1969, 1970, and 1971.  P.L. 480 II Grant for 1993 includes $2.1
million in Sec. 416 food donations.
TQ  = Transition Quarter; change from June to September fiscal year
*  = less than $100,000
I.M.E.T.  = International Military Education and Training
UNRWA  = United Nations Relief and Works Agency
Surplus  = Surplus Property
Tech. Asst.  = Technical Assistance
Narc.  = International Narcotics Control
D. A.  = Development Assistance
ESF  = Economic Support Funds
P.L. 480 I  = Public Law 480 (Food for Peace), Title I Loan
P.L. 480 II  = Public Law 480 (Food for Peace), Title II Grant
P  = Preliminary
